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Introduction
Perhaps the most significant change to the formal institutions of Irish governance
over the past decade has been the establishment of independent regulatory agencies.
These agencies are designed to be independent or non-majoritarian — they have been
delegated specific regulatory powers for which the traditional hierarchical institutions of
government are considered to be inappropriate.
i They are significant in terms of
governance because of the decision of political actors to delegate important policy
making powers to agencies outside their immediate control and for the consequent
challenge of how to reconcile the apparent paradox of preserving independence while
maintaining accountability to the political system.
The focus of this chapter is on the evolution of these new regulatory actors and
the gradual emergence of regulatory governance as a distinctive form with its own pattern
of interaction between state and private actors. It argues that regulatory governance has
taken time to evolve and that its uneven path can only be understood by reference to
Ireland’s existing configuration of institutions and the corresponding preferences of key
actors. In particular, the combination of a high concentration of executive authority, a
corporatist style of policy-making, and a parliament with little interest in oversight posed
significant challenges to the emergence of a new regulatory regime (See Hardiman, ch.
1).
However, an examination of the institutional constraints that confronted the regulators
serves the purpose of illuminating a wider set of questions about governance in the Irish2
political system and the system’s ability to adapt to the demands and preferences of a
broader range of both public and private actors.
The initial decision to create regulatory actors was in the Irish case prompted
largely by the demands of EU legislation that prevented the government from both
owning and regulating utilities.
ii The result, particularly in the case of Telecom—where
the state has sold its entire stake—is an obviously important shift in the role of the state,
from owner to regulator. However, the decision to delegate powers to regulators, initially
made somewhat reluctantly in the case of the utilities, has proven to be increasingly
attractive to political actors, so that regulatory governance has emerged as an increasingly
popular institutional choice.
Thus what has emerged in terms of the functions of the state is what Rhodes
describes as a “hollowing out,” as the state chooses to divest itself of a series of
regulatory functions (Rhodes 1994). Osborne and Gaebler describe the result of
delegation as a shift in the role of the state from “rowing to steering” (Osborne and
Gaebler 1993).
Analytical Framework
As Table 1 indicates, a plethora of regulators and agencies with significant
regulatory responsibilities have been created over the past fifteen years.
iii3
Table 1: Irish Regulators
SECTOR AGENCY/REGULATOR YEAR
CREATED
Accounting Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory
Authority (IAASA)
2003
Aviation Commission for Aviation Regulation 2001
Competition Competition Authority 1991
Electricity Commission for Energy Regulation (CER)
(originally the Commission for Electricity
Regulation)
1999
Environment Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 1992
Financial Markets Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority 2002
Food Safety Food Safety Authority of Ireland 1998
Pharmaceuticals Irish Medicine Board 1995
Taxis Commission for Taxi Regulation 2004
Telecommunications Commission for Communications Regulation
(ComReg)
(originally Office of the Director of
Telecommunications Regulation, ODTR)
1996
Source: compiled by author
The chapter focuses upon three particular cases of regulatory reform: telecoms,
energy, and financial markets. The rationale behind the choice of these cases is firstly
their importance in a modern economy meaning that state and private actors can be
assumed to have highly developed interests and policy preferences. The second rationale
is methodological in that the evolution of these interests and policy preferences can be
assessed over time which allows for process tracing.4
In the cases of telecoms and energy, a regulatory regime was created from
scratch, whereas in financial regulation, a new single regulator was created that replaced
existing actors. The analysis uses a principal/agent framework whereby the principals are
the government and the Oireachtas and the agents are the regulators. This approach
allows for an identification of the shifting preferences of the key actors over time. It also
allows for an analysis of what Kathy Thelen has identified as the need for institutions to
maintain and nurture political support if they are to evolve and flourish (Thelen 2004).
History of Independent Regulators
The concept of an agency with a specific regulatory mandate but separate status
from the hierarchal institutions of government was traditionally an American
phenomenon that dates back to the end of the nineteenth century (Eisner 2000). As
Shipan describes, the initial rationale for an independent regulatory commission came
from the “scientific management school” that argued that to achieve optimal policy
outcomes, politics and administration needed to be separated, and that the creation of
agencies that were outside both the executive and the legislative branches was the most
appropriate means of achieving such an objective (Shipan 2006). The political appeal of
these new actors saw the creation of a bundle of agencies during the twentieth century,
with a particular peak at the time of the New Deal (Eisner 2000).
The Thatcher government in Britain is credited with being the first government to
create regulatory agencies with similar-type powers outside the United States. The need
for these new institutional actors followed the Conservative government’s decision to
privatize previously publicly owned utilities, notably British Telecom and British Gas.
Privatization meant that a regulator independent of government was required to oversee5
the firms, due both to the state’s continued ownership of significant stakes but also
because of the firms’ continued monopoly or at best duopoly status. The paradoxical
result was, as Steven Vogel pointed out, that the Conservative government’s ambition to
deregulate and liberalize utility markets actually resulted in re-regulation and the creation
of what became new and powerful regulatory actors (Vogel 1997).
From an Irish perspective, the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, with
its objective of a single market by 1992, proved to be particularly significant in the
evolution of regulatory policy. The result of the SEA was a swathe of directives across a
broad range of policy areas that led to what Mark Thatcher describes as “a rapid and
sustained expansion of regulation in Europe” and the emergence of what Majone has
described as the emergence of the EU as a “regulatory state” (Thatcher 2001; Majone
1996). It was therefore “top-down” Europeanization, understood as the mechanisms by
which EU policies and directives affect the domestic policies and institutions of member
states, that has proven important in explaining the emergence of much of Ireland’s
regulatory policy (Radiaelli 2003; Borzel 2005). The institutional implication of the
Europeanization of regulatory policy has depended upon the “goodness of fit” with
member states’ existing regulatory architectures (Schmidt 2002). With respect to utility
regulation, for the Irish case, like the majority of EU states, it meant the creation of new
regulatory agencies with a significant level of independence from the existing
hierarchical government structure (Thatcher 2002). However, in the case of financial and
other important areas of regulation, the EU has not mandated any particular institutional
design or level of independence from government, so member states have had the
freedom to implement directives to suit their particular institutional preferences. As a6
result, Gilardi has found evidence of considerable variation in terms of regulatory design
and independence (2002). But the result of the emergence of the EU as a regulatory state
is that for Ireland, as for all EU member states, regulation is firmly, in Putnam’s terms, a
two-level game, played out at both an EU and a domestic level (Putnam 1988). However,
it is important to emphasize that the decision to delegate regulatory responsibility is not
just a result of Europeanization but reflects other political incentives.
Why independent?
Why do politicians decide to delegate important powers to actors that are beyond
their immediate control? There is, not surprisingly, a great deal of academic debate
regarding the apparent paradox as to why political actors should voluntarily choose to
weaken their powers. Three rationales are pointed to. First is to ensure the credibility of a
regulatory decision, also called the credible commitment rationale (Kydland and Prescott
1977; Levy and Spiller 1996). If, it is argued, the market recognizes that regulatory
decisions will be overturned due to changes in public opinion or government, the result
will be uncertainty and ultimately a less desirable policy outcome. The credible
commitment rationale is key to the argument as to why central banks are given autonomy
in terms of monetary policy, where it is claimed that the outcome is lower rates of
inflation than a monetary policy regime directly influenced by partisan concerns could
provide (Grilli et al., 1991; Cukierman 1992). The argument also conveniently gives a
reason for politicians to tie the hands of future governments by making it difficult for
them to overturn existing policies.
The second rationale for why delegation occurs is that it insulates politicians from
the fallout of unpopular decisions by shifting the blame to the regulator (Weaver 1987;7
Egan 2004). By definition, regulators must adjudicate on important policy issues with
significant distributional outcomes, so it can be of obvious political advantage for
governments to avoid taking responsibility for decisions that could alienate important
interest groups and potential voters.
The third rationale is to ensure a high level of expertise in the making of
regulatory decisions. It is argued that regulation frequently involves policy issues of high
technical complexity that pose significant difficulties for existing government
departments due to their lack of sufficient expertise (Majone 1997, 2001). The creation of
a regulatory agency therefore allows for the cultivation of such expertise, both in terms of
allowing for high levels of staff specialization and in the ability to recruit outside of
normal public service guidelines.
How to hold regulatory actors accountable
If there are clear arguments as to why governments should consider delegating
powers to regulatory agencies, there is a thriving academic literature analyzing how
government and legislative actors can ensure agencies remain accountable to the political
system. Democratic theory assumes that at a certain level there should be a link between
the citizens of a country and its policies. There is also an assumption that in most cases
citizens must delegate responsibility to elected politicians to create and enact policies,
and that if citizens do not like them, they can choose to vote their elected representatives
out of office. The creation of agencies that are, to some degree, outside the control of
politicians but responsible for important decisions, obviously serves to weaken further the
direct link of delegation. The political challenge is therefore how to minimize the trade-8
off between the advantages of independent agencies and the apparent threat to the
normal process of democratic accountability.
The most widely applied theoretical framework used to analyze this trade-off is
that of principal/agent, derived largely from economics of organizations, where the
government and the legislature are considered the principals and the regulator is
considered the agent (Moe 1984; Weingast and Moran 1983, Epstein and O’Halloran
1999)
iv. The principals are assumed to seek to minimize “agency losses’, defined as a
situation where agents act contrary to the preferences of the principal, because of
“shirking”, where agents act to pursue their own preferences. The degree of independence
is shaped therefore by ex ante mechanisms such as the legislative mandate that describes
the role and objectives of the regulator and by a series of ex post mechanisms requiring
the regulator to report on its actions to the principals. In terms of ex post mechanisms,
McCubbins and Schwarz describe how legislative committees can choose between two
styles of oversight: police patrols or fire alarm. In the case of police patrol, regulatory
oversight is “centralized, active and direct” and includes legislative hearings and special
inquiries, whereas fire alarm is less active and indirect, and encourages citizens to bring
agency discretion to the attention of principals (McCubbins and Schwarz 1984).
While the principal/agent framework has limitations—notably in the European
context in identifying exactly who are the regulatory principals given the important role
of EU institutions—it is a useful lens by which to analyze the incentives of the different
actors that make up the domestic regulatory regime and the success or otherwise of the
accountability structure.9
Cases: the Irish Context
Before laying out the details of the telecom and electricity cases, it is important to
emphasize that prior to the establishment of the regulators—given the state’s long-term
ownership of both monopolies—there was no explicit regulatory policy or objective.
Instead the state had a diverse set of policy preferences that included employment
generation and regional development, often at the expense of efficiency and profit
(Guiomard 1995). The result was that policy outcomes tended to reflect the interests of
producers rather than consumers, and given the importance that state actors placed upon
social partnership during the 1990s, challenging the entrenched interests in both firms
had proven to be difficult. They also reflected the institutional design of the partnership
process, where there was no explicit role for the interests of consumers (OECD 2001).
In terms of political institutions, the predominance of producer interests reflected
the incentives predicted by a PR electoral system, as suggested by Lijphart and Crepez
(1991). It also reflected the preferences of state actors, focusing upon employment
growth following the economic turmoil of the 1980s, and the need to satisfy the
requirements of the Maastrict criteria.
Telecoms
The immediate catalyst for the creation of an independent regulator was the
government decision to sell a stake in Telecom in 1996 to a foreign consortium, KPN
Telia. This was motivated largely by the need to invest in Telecom’s infrastructure, but
the government was constrained by the obligations of the Maastricht criteria from doing
so from its current spending (Chari and McMahon 2003).10
The sale of the stake prompted the passing of the Telecoms Miscellaneous
Provisions Act (1996), the Act that set up the Office of the Director of Telecoms
Regulation (ODTR). While the state had obtained derogation in terms of opening up the
domestic market to full competition, the EU, through a range of directives, had a stated
ambition to end national monopolies and ensure competition. Telecom’s monopoly was
clearly coming to at an end (Thatcher 2002). Once the decision was made to sell a stake
in the firm, EU directives demanded the creation of a regulator independent from
government.
v However, from a government perspective, the other rationales described
earlier were also clearly important. First, in terms of credible commitment, KPN Telia as
the new owner of the significant minority stake was unlikely to agree to a situation where
the state continued to be both a shareholder and the de facto regulator. Second, given the
increasing complexity of telecoms as a policy issue, there was also an obvious need for
expertise. Third, telecoms policy was politically controversial so blame shifting can also
be seen as a further attraction. While telecoms pricing was always contentious in an Irish
context, issues such as levels of competition and the need to encourage technological
innovation were also becoming controversial in a way that further explains an incentive
to shift the responsibility for decisions.
However, the 1996 legislation—the crucial ex ante mechanism—neglected to
signal any formal objectives for the ODTR either in terms of promoting competition or
performing a social welfare function. The legislation stipulated that the ODTR was to be
“independent in the course of its functions,” but did not clarify how the new regulator
was to interact with the legislature (ODTR 1996). It also contained no requirement to set11
up a consumer panel, which was the usual mechanism for ensuring a formal role for
consumers in the formulation of policy.
The most immediate result was a major controversy that erupted when the
Director of the ODTR refused to appear before an Oireachtas committee in January 1998
on the grounds that it could compromise the agency’s independence. This prompted a
political furor, with the relevant committee changing its terms of reference to compel the
director to appear. However, the controversy sparked broader questions about
accountability when the then Attorney General stated: “[L]egislators should not stand
over any system which takes away the rights of citizens to hold to account individuals
that affect their everyday lives” (Byrne 1998).
The other damaging implication of the 1996 legislation was the lack of powers it
gave to the ODTR to take firms, particularly Telecom, to task for their tardiness in
implementing the requirements of various EU directives. Consequently, decisions of the
ODTR were consistently appealed to the judicial system, resulting in long delays and the
subsequent hindrance of competition. The result was high prices for telecom services, as
Telecom maintained a virtual monopoly in fixed line and a duopoly in mobile, and
consequently low levels of innovation, with long delays in the unbundling of the local
loop (OECD 2001).
However, despite its clear inadequacies as a regulator, the creation of the ODTR
can be seen, in retrospect, as a turning point in terms of Irish governance. First, the
creation of a regulator with statutory powers did mean a formal shift away from
traditional governance structures to a rule oriented, arms length style of governance,
emblematic of the regulatory state. Second, it meant a change in the way that policy was12
formulated. This included formal requirements for the ODTR to consult with relevant
private actors; transparency, where the ODTR had to publish consultation papers; and
finally, justification, where the ODTR had to explain its decisions. These changes in the
way that regulatory policy was made can be understood to affect different actors’
strategic options in terms of how they chose to interact with the regulator. Third, the
decision to fund the ODTR from a levy imposed on the regulated firms, as opposed to a
ministerial budget, gave it an important degree of financial independence that allowed it,
over time, to build up its resources and expertise.
The government’s sale of its remaining stake in Telecom in 1999 did serve to
reduce the conflict of interest with regards to regulation. This was made possible by an
agreement between the government and the Telecom unions a year previously to an
Employee Share Ownership Programme, under which the employees purchased fifteen
per cent of the firm.
Commission for Energy Regulation
The Commission for Electricity Regulation (as it was originally termed) was
formally established in 1999, following the 1996 EU directive that opened up domestic
electricity markets to competition. The directive not only allowed for a certain level of
third party access to the electricity network but also ended the domestic monopoly rights
for the construction of power lines and power stations (Eising and Jacbo 2001). The
result was again that a regulator was required under EU legislation to ensure the
development of a market. However, unlike the telecom case, there was no change in the
status of the Electricity Supply Board, which remained firmly under the ownership of the
state.13
If Europeanization was the undisputed key explanatory variable, the decision to
create the CER fulfilled other political aims. The need to encourage other firms into the
Irish market meant that the credible commitment rationale was clear, as was the need for
regulatory expertise, and an interest in shifting the blame to the regulator for
responsibility for energy costs. In terms of the accountability structure, the CER
legislation did learn one lesson from the mishaps of telecoms regulation in so far as the
obligation to appear in front of the Oireachtas was explicitly stated. However, no formal
objectives for the regulator were established and no consumer panel was mandated
(Westrup 2002). The result was again a regulatory policy that appeared to favor the
interests of the incumbent producer at the expense of increased competition.
The government chose to expand the CER’s remit to include gas regulation and changed
its name to the Commission for Energy Regulation in 2002 but left its underlying remit
unaffected.
Financial Regulation
With respect to financial regulation, the important institutional difference from
the utility cases was that prior to reform there already existed a range of regulatory actors,
the most important of which was the Central Bank.
vi There was also a clear difference in
the role of a financial regulator from that of a utility regulator. A financial regulator has
two distinct objectives: first, to avoid a systemic failure of the banking system given its
crucial role in allocating credit, and second, to counter the particular problem of
asymmetric information where the consumers of financial services have difficulty
assessing the risks and returns of products.14
While the Central Bank’s regulatory responsibilities were increased by successive
governments during the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the need to implement a range of
EU directives, there were some unusual features unique to the Irish regulatory regime. In
particular was the lack of a specific regulator to oversee the securities markets, a
responsibility that was delegated to the British Securities and Investment Board until
1995 when the Central Bank was given the task (Westrup 2005). This gap was surprising
given how the scope and significance of financial regulation had grown during the 1990s
as financial services had evolved into a key sector of the economy, and was given
additional impetus from the success of the Financial Services Centre (McSharry and
White 2000).
The catalyst for regulatory reform was a series of financial failures and scandals
which suggested that the Central Bank was struggling to cope with increasingly consumer
focused issues of regulation. An advisory group, appointed by the government in 1998,
recommended that a regulator be established that was completely separate from the Bank,
arguing that due to its monetary policy independence it could not be sufficiently
accountable to the political system (McDowell 1999). However, the report set off a
clamour from the banks and other financial services firms arguing for the retention of the
Bank as regulator. The government, after deliberating for nearly two years, decided in
2001 upon a curious hybrid – the new regulator was established as part of a newly
constituted Central Bank.
vii Given that the decision was at odds with the
recommendations of the expert group, it proved to be controversial, particularly as during
the period in which the government was deliberating, the Oireachtas report on the15
Deposit Interest Retention Tax scandal was published, suggesting that the Central Bank’s
regulatory oversight of the banking sector had been far from robust.
So why did the government decide to reject the advice of its own advisory group
and opt for such an unconventional regulatory design? What is clear is that neither the
key state nor private actors wanted a change in the Central Bank’s regulatory role. The
close relationship between the Department of Finance and the Central Bank was typified
by the almost automatic appointment of the First Secretary of the Department to be
Governor of the Bank. The result was reluctance by these key state actors for a regulator
to be created that was outside their control. The aggressive lobbying by the banks and the
financial firms located in the IFSC confirmed their resistance to change in the regulatory
status quo (Westrup 2005).
Despite its peculiar relationship with the Central Bank, the new financial
regulator, which finally opened its doors in May 2003, signifies an important break with
the previous regulatory regime. For the first time, the regulator was given an explicit
mandate to protect the interests of consumers.
viii Again as in the utility cases, the
decision-making processes of the regulator were open to greater scrutiny, as consultation
documents and the responses of firms were to be published. Finally, the explicit funding
of regulation by levies on financial firms rather than from the revenues of the Central
Bank allowed for a more transparent form of funding.
Initial Misgivings
An overview of all three cases provides important common insights from the
perspective of a principal/agent framework. The initial pattern of regulatory policy-
making was characterized by a distinct reluctance by state actors to delegate sufficient16
powers to the utility regulators to allow them to challenge the positions of the
incumbents. An analogy can be drawn with the case of financial regulation, where the
existing regulator, the Central Bank, in conjunction with powerful private actors, was
able to persuade the government to make an incremental reform rather than the decisive
one recommended. The interests of producer groups, adept at using the existing
institutional configuration to pursue their preferences, clearly remained predominant. In
all three areas of policy there was evidence of a significant level of what Stigler identified
as “regulatory capture,” where the regulatory regime reflected the interests of the
regulated industry rather than the interests of consumers (Stigler 1971; Pelzman 1976).
Indeed, in the case of the utility regulators, there was no formal recognition of the
interests of consumers, while in the case of financial regulation they were recognized but
very belatedly. The result was distinct policy outcomes that resulted in the continuation
of comparatively high telephone, energy and banking charges and relatively constrained
choices for consumers (OECD 2001; Competition Authority 2004).
In terms of principal/agent theory, we see initial reluctance by the key principal,
state actors, to grant significant powers to regulators that were outside their immediate
control. Indeed, in the case of the utilities, it is possible to argue that without the
requirements of Europeanization, despite the other political benefits that accrued from
delegation, the state would have chosen not to create independent regulators. The
counterfactual is underpinned by the government’s decision not to create regulators prior
to EU requirements and, once created, the reluctance to specify objectives and delegate
sufficient powers to them to allow them to challenge the interests of the incumbent firms.17
The oversight role of the other principal, the Oireachtas, despite protestations at
the ODTR’s initial refusal to appear, subsequently proved to be very limited. Indeed a
study has indicated that the pattern of Oireachtas committee hearings with regulators in
all three cases was infrequent and marked by long gaps (Westrup 2002). The
comparative weakness of the committee system in terms of resources, allied with
Gallagher’s finding of the lack of political incentive to pursue an oversight role, meant
that in McCubbins and Schwarz’s terms, the Oireachtas has certainly not pursued a police
patrol style of oversight (Gallagher 1999). While the fire alarm metaphor is a more
accurate description, even that assumes a certain institutional capability which, despite
the attempts of individual members, the Oireachtas committee system struggles to
provide.
The result of the actions of both principals is that the initial stage of regulatory
reform resulted in limited change in policy-making and very little change in policy
outcomes. The creation of new regulatory institutions was therefore not sufficient to
challenge the existing patterns of policy-making that were conditioned by the broader
configuration and preferences of political actors and institutions.
Regulatory Change
However, if it is possible to identify an initial period of regulatory reform that
began with the set-up of the ODTR in 1997, characterized by the continuation of existing
patterns of policy-making despite the efforts of the new regulatory actors, there is also
evidence of a second period, beginning in or around 2002, that has seen regulatory
agencies gradually emerge as actors with real powers and political influence. This change18
reflects a gradual evolution in the preferences of key regulatory actors, particularly those
of the state.
First, and perhaps most significantly, there has been a realization that the
regulatory outcomes that resulted from the initial period of reform were in conflict with
the state’s broader economic development goals, particularly that of attracting
technologically sophisticated international firms to Ireland. A lack of technological
innovation in terms of the range of available telecom services and high telecom and
energy costs are not attractive options for firms with many choices as to where to invest.
A critical report by the OECD in 2001 that emphasized both the potential consequences
of high telecom and energy costs and argued a key rationale was that “consumer interests
are not well represented in policy debate and deliberation in Ireland, which remains
dominated by producer interests” was particularly influential, judging by the policy
response it evoked (OECD 2001).
ix Preferences of previously significant insiders such as
Telecom and its union members were no longer as important as those of a wider range of
private actors.
x
Second, there was a realization by state actors initially suspicious of delegating
power to regulators that the other rationales for delegation were proving to be
increasingly politically attractive. The decision to create the Commission for Aviation
Regulation to regulate airport charges in 1999 was a decision triggered not by
Europeanization but by a combination of credible commitment, blame shifting and the
need for expertise. Indeed, the decision to create a taxi regulator in 2004, and
subsequently a regulator to oversee the accountancy profession in 2005 is further
evidence of the political appeal of this relatively new form of governance. This19
institutional innovation also provides evidence that senior civil servants have overcome
much of their apparent aversion to change in terms of Irish governance, aided
undoubtedly by the continued growth of the economy.
An indication of the changing preferences of state actors was a number of reports,
high-level appointments and legislation designed to strengthen the efficiency of the
existing regulatory institutions. The High Level Group on Regulation, appointed
following the OECD report, produced a series of plans including Towards Better
Regulation in 2002 that culminated in a White Paper in 2004 titled Regulating Better.
This document set out a commitment to pursue a key recommendation of the OECD
which was to mandate regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) as a means of targeting the
effects of regulation.
xi This reflected a government desire to ensure that regulation was
both efficient but also proportional as business groups such as IBEC and the Financial
Services lobby became increasingly vocal about the increased cost of compliance (IBEC
2004).
The first important legislative changes took place in 2002 when the government
enacted many of the policy proposals first floated by the then Department of Public
Enterprise in 2000 to improve the accountability and efficiency of the new regulatory
regime (Department of Public Enterprise 2000). The legislation formulated broad
objectives for the regulators that included promoting competition, increasing powers to
fine firms, that regulatory decisions should stand while under judicial review, and a
change in the executive format from a single director to a three-person commission. The
Office of the Director of Telecom Regulation’s name was also changed to Comreg,
reflecting the inclusion of responsibility for postal services made in 2000. However, the20
2002 legislation still did not specify that an explicit forum for consumers be established,
which was the norm in the majority of other EU and OECD states.
A further significant institutional response was the government decision to
strengthen the mandate of the Competition Authority – the Competition Act of 2002 was
described as “a remarkable step forward” by its then chairperson (Fingleton 2004).
xii
Given the apparent lack of competition that resulted from the initial round of utility
regulation, the dramatic strengthening of the powers and budget of the Competition
Authority was a further indication that political and state actors were serious in their
intent to challenge the regulatory status quo.
If state and political actors were choosing to define and strengthen the role of
regulators, the regulators themselves were also beginning to assert their institutional
authority and to build up their institutional capacity. Coen has demonstrated how
regulatory actors develop this capacity over time both from interaction with private actors
and institutional learning from membership in their relevant EU regulatory groups (Coen
2005). Given the important powers delegated to regulators and the particular style of
policy-making characterized by a relatively high level of transparency and justification,
Coen argues that firms and regulators have a mutual interest in exchanging information
that develops the expertise of the regulator. Even if in the Irish case the initial regulatory
pattern resembled capture, the strengthening of the regulators’ powers in the 2002
legislation, in conjunction with the greater political commitment to making the regime
work, suggest that the institutional capacity of the regulators has increased. The result is
their emergence as significant actors in the regulatory game, with their own interests and
preferences, developing an institutional clout that goes beyond their delegated legal21
powers. Obviously, the case of each regulator is somewhat different in this regard and is
dependent on other factors such as the political entrepreneurship of the respective senior
executives.
The final formal institutional change in the regulatory regime came in 2005 with
the decision to create a National Consumers Agency with a specific mandate to promote
the interests of consumers. While there has been an agency, the Office of the Director of
Consumer Affairs, with responsibility for issues such as accurate display of prices, its
mandate and resources have been very limited as compared to the stated objectives for
the new agency.
While consumers as a lobby group often suffer from a collective action problem,
this was clearly exacerbated by Ireland’s particular institutional configuration. As we
have seen, even the decision to create independent regulators did not lead to the
establishment of consumer panels, as was usual in most EU states, to provide for the
promotion of a consumer welfare function and some sort of balance to the interests of
producers. The decision to create a consumer agency was a recommendation of another
High Level Regulatory Group but can also be seen as a result of both political and media
pressure as Fine Gael was promoting its Rip-off Ireland campaign and high profile
television exposés.
So what we have is a situation where one set of principals, state actors, have
chosen to strengthen the ex ante mechanisms as they laid out more explicit regulatory
objectives but the other principal, the Oireachtas, has chosen to increase its ex post role
only at the very margin. However, the establishment of an agency to promote the interests
of consumers, along with an increased party political and media interest in regulatory22
policy may result in other actors taking on the ex post role, thereby increasing the level of
oversight.
However, even with all these institutional changes over the past few years, there
remains evidence that Ireland’s regulatory outcomes are still characterized by signs of
capture. The EU has found evidence that in both the cases of both energy and
telecommunications, prices in Ireland are still comparatively high and levels of
competition are low (Irish Times 15/2/06; Irish Times 21/3/06). The delays in opening up
to competition the ESB generation and distribution networks, along with the state’s
continued ownership role, has meant that suspicions of continued conflict in terms of the
preferences of state actors persist.
Conclusion
Effective regulatory governance remains a work in progress. This chapter
attempts to highlight important changes in the preferences of key actors since the initial
demands of the EU saw the establishment of the ODTR in 1997.
In theoretical terms, the evolution of Ireland’s regulatory regime is a reminder
that a formal decision to delegate powers does not automatically lead to the creation of
powerful regulatory actors. Instead, policy regimes are slow to change, conditioned by
existing institutional configurations, and as Thelen argues, require a continued political
preference for the change to be sustained (Thelen 2004).
In terms of the wider issues of Irish governance, the introduction of independent
regulatory agencies illustrates two important points. First, it emphasizes how one key
interest, that of consumers, has consistently been prevented by the existing institutions
and actors from having a distinctive voice in Irish policy-making. The result has been that23
issues of competition and consumer choice have struggled to find a place on the political
agenda. Second, it highlights the continued weakness of the Oireachtas in the pursuit of
an oversight role. As regulatory governance continues to become a more important part
of the way the state operates, such a gap promises to become even more significant. The
Oireachtas’ role may be compensated for in part by other actors, but in normative terms,
it remains a significant issue for the future evolution of Irish governance.
More broadly, regulatory governance is likely to become an even more important
part of Irish politics. This reflects not only the demands of the European Union, which
ensures that regulation will remain a multi-level game as actors use both the European
and the Irish political processes to argue for their interests, but also reflects the
increased attraction of regulators to political actors at a time when the traditional
hierarchical institutions of government are struggling to cope with the increasing
complexity and visibility of many policy issues. Blaming the regulator looks set to
remain a popular political choice.
i Coen and Thatcher define a non majoritarian regulator as “an unelected body that is
organizationally separate from governments and has powers of regulation of markets
through endorsement or formal delegation by public bodies” (Coen and Thatcher 2005,
330).
ii However, as Charles Shipan has described, the Environmental Protection Agency was
given a level of independence from the Department of the Environment in 1993 (Shipan
2006).
iii Deciding upon a list of agencies with regulatory responsibilities is obviously a
subjective task as a wide range of government and private agencies possess certain
regulatory powers. Indeed, it could be argued that agencies such as the EPA and the
Medicines Board should be distinguished from regulators such as the CER and ComReg24
because they carry out a range of functions that do not entail regulation. However, given
the importance of their regulatory
iv However, in a Westminster style government, the government and the legislature can
often be considered as a single principal, as the government party virtually always has a
majority in both the legislature and on the relevant parliamentary committee. See
Gallagher 1999 for further discussion.
v Independence of the regulator from the shareholder is an EU requirement set out in
Directive 90/388/EEC and amplified by the Court of Justice.
vi The regulator for the insurance sector was the Department of Enterprise, Trade and
Employment.
vii The new regulatory structure was unique in terms of its design in the EU and the
OECD as states either decided upon a stand-alone single regulator, such as Germany or
the U.K., or to maintain the role of the Central Bank such as France, Spain and Italy
(Masciandaro 2005).
viii The legislation also created a consumer panel which the regulator had to fund and
consult with.
ix The Department of the Taoiseach immediately held a press conference to announce the
setting up of the High Level Group on Regulation made up of senior civil servants and
regulators to respond to the OECD report.(See
http://www.betterregulation.ie/index.asp?docID=41 for a fuller description).
x The comments of the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern in 2004, are a confirmation of this
change in view. Acceptance by the Taoiseach in November 2004: “For too long, producer
interests have shaped the policy agenda.” www.betterregulation.ie/index.asp?docID=68.
xi The government had previously committed itself to such a process in 1999 with the
Regulating Red Tape initiative, but the OECD argued that the process was not followed
through with sufficient rigor (OECD 2001).
xii The Act established the Authority as a public body with its own budget and proceeded
to play a high-profile role in examining a range of policy areas.25
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